Weak Probabilistic Anonymity  by Deng, Yuxin et al.
Weak Probabilistic Anonymity 1
Yuxin Deng2
INRIA Sophia-Antipolis and Universite´ Paris 7
Catuscia Palamidessi Jun Pang
INRIA Futurs and LIX, E´cole Polytechnique
Abstract
Anonymity means that the identity of the user performing a certain action is maintained secret. The
protocols for ensuring anonymity often use random mechanisms which can be described probabilistically.
In this paper we propose a notion of weak probabilistic anonymity, where weak refers to the fact that some
amount of probabilistic information may be revealed by the protocol. This information can be used by an
observer to infer the likeliness that the action has been performed by a certain user. The aim of this work
is to study the degree of anonymity that the protocol can still ensure, despite the leakage of information.
We illustrate our ideas by using the example of the dining cryptographers with biased coins. We consider
both the cases of nondeterministic and probabilistic users. Correspondingly, we propose two notions of weak
anonymity and we investigate their respective dependencies on the biased factor of the coins.
Keywords: Anonymity, Probability, Nondeterminism, Dining Cryptographers.
1 Introduction
Anonymity is the property of keeping secret the identity of the user performing a
certain action. The need for anonymity may raise in a wide range of situations, like
postings on electronic forums, voting, delation, donations, and many others.
The protocols for ensuring anonymity often use random mechanisms. This is the
case, for example, of the Dining Cryptographers [6], Crowds [11], Onion Routing
[15], and SG-MIX [9].
Various notions of probabilistic anonymity have been investigated in the litera-
ture [6,11,7,4]. In this paper we propose a notion of weak probabilistic anonymity,
where weak refers to the fact that some amount of probabilistic information may
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be revealed by the protocol. Typical causes may be either the presence of attackers
which interfere with the normal execution the protocol, or some unavoidable imper-
fection of the internal mechanisms, or may even be inherent to the way the protocol
is designed. In any case, the information leaked by the system can be used by an
observer to infer the likeliness that the action has been performed by a certain user.
The aim of this work is to study the degree of anonymity that the protocol can still
ensure, despite the leakage of information.
We illustrate our ideas by using the example of the Dining Cryptographers Prob-
lem (DCP). In this protocol, a number of users (cryptographers) cooperate to ensure
that the occurrence of a certain action is made visible, while the cryptographer who
has performed it remains anonymous. They achieve this goal by executing a certain
algorithm which involves coin tossing. In the original formulation of [6] the coins
are perfectly fair and no one (except the authorized cryptographers) gets any infor-
mation about the results of the coins. As a consequence of these assumptions, the
protocol ensures strong anonymity in the sense that, from the point of view of an
observer, there is no way to infer that a cryptographers is more likely than another
to have performed the action.
We consider a more realistic scenario in which some probabilistic information
may be leaked by the system. In particular, we consider the case in which this
happens due to imperfections in its internal mechanisms. In the case of the DCP,
this means to relax the hypothesis of perfect fairness of the coins. It is worth noting
that even if an observer does not know a priori whether and how much the coins in
the DCP are biased, he may be able to infer it statistically by running the protocol
several times [4]. One of the main purposes of this work is to investigate how the
biased factor of the coins inﬂuences the level of anonymity that the system can still
achieve.
An issue to consider when we deal with a probabilistic system is whether or not
there is also some nondeterministic choice involved. Nondeterministic means that
the choice is completely unpredictable, typically because the mechanisms which
determine it may change every time, so that the behavior cannot be described
probabilistically, not even by repeating statistical observations. Probabilistic means
that there is a regularity in those mechanisms. The probability distribution may
still be unknown, for instance because we don’t know how the mechanisms operate,
but we expect to be able to infer it from statistical samples.
In anonymity protocols, depending on the circumstances, the users may be either
probabilistic or nondeterministic. Typically the latter applies in dynamic scenarios,
when the users change all the time. In the nondeterministic case, the probabilistic
aspect of anonymity can only be relative to the probability of the observables, which
derives solely from the randomness of the internal mechanisms of the protocol. The
natural notion of anonymity is then that the probability of the observables does not
give information about the user.
In the case of probabilistic users, there are two possible points of view under
which one can deﬁne the notion of anonymity. Namely, we can focus on the prob-
ability of the observables, and require that they do not allow to infer information
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about the probability of the users (similarly to the nondeterministic case), or we
can focus on the probability of the users, and require that the system does not allow
to infer extra information about it through the observables. Interestingly, in the
case of strong anonymity these two notions have been proved equivalent [4].
In this paper we consider both the cases of nondeterministic and probabilistic
users, and we propose two notions of weak anonymity corresponding to the two
points of view illustrated above. Although, as just said, in the limit case of strong
anonymity these two notions are equivalent, their functional dependency on the
biased factor of the coins turns out to be totally diﬀerent.
1.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this work are:
• We propose two notions of weak probabilistic anonymity, for the cases of nonde-
terministic and probabilistic users, respectively.
• We consider the Dining Cryptographers with biased coins, and we study how the
two notions of weak anonymity depend on the biased factor of the coins.
• We show how to code the formulas that expresses weak anonymity in PRISM, so
that their validity can be checked automatically on a generic protocol.
1.2 Plan of the paper
In next section we recall some notions which are used in the rest of the paper: the
Probabilistic Automata, the Dining Cryptographers Problem, and the framework
for anonymity developed in [4]. In Section 3 we propose a notion of weak anonymity
for nondeterministic users, and we study the dependency on the biased factor of the
coins for the DCP. In Section 4 we do the same for the case of probabilistic users.
In Section 5 we code in PRISM the DCP and the notions of anonymity. Finally, in
Section 6 we conclude and discuss some related work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Nondeterminism and probability
In this paper we consider systems that can perform both probabilistic and nonde-
terministic choices. Intuitively, a probabilistic choice represents a set of alternative
transitions, each of them associated to a certain probability of being selected. The
sum of all probabilities on the alternatives of the choice must be 1, i.e. they form
a probability distribution. Nondeterministic choice is also a set of alternatives, but
we have no information on how likely one alternative is selected.
We take the point of view that a nondeterministic choice is not a probabilistic
choice with unknown probabilities: in the latter, if we repeatedly run the program, we
can infer the probability. For instance, if we have a choice between two transitions
and we observe that they are selected with the same frequency, we can infer that
the probability is close to 1/2. In the nondeterministic case, this inference would be
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Fig. 1. Examples of probabilistic automata
invalid. Nondeterministic means that the choice is totally unpredictable and that
there is no assumption of regularity through time on the mechanisms that determine
the selection.
There have been many models proposed in literature that combine both non-
deterministic and probabilistic choice. One of the most general is the formalism of
probabilistic automata proposed in [14]. We give here a brief and informal descrip-
tion of it.
A probabilistic automaton consists in a set of states, and labeled transitions
between them. For each node, the outgoing transitions are partitioned in groups
called steps. Each step represents a probabilistic choice, while the choice between
the steps is nondeterministic.
Figure 1 illustrates some examples of probabilistic automata. We represent a
step by putting an arc across the member transitions. For instance, in (a), state s1
has two steps, the ﬁrst is a probabilistic choice between two transitions with labels
a and b, each with probability 1/2. When there is only a transition in a step, like
the one from state s3 to state s6, the probability is of course 1 and we omit it.
In this paper, we use only a simpliﬁed kind of automaton, in which from each
node we have either a probabilistic choice or a nondeterministic choice (more pre-
cisely, either one step or a set of singleton steps), like in (b). This is not a real
restriction since it subsumes the so-called alternated model, in which probabilistic
and nondeterministic choices alternate, and which is known to have the same ex-
pressive power as the full probabilistic automata. In the particular case that the
choices are all probabilistic, like in (c), the automaton is called fully probabilistic.
Given an automaton M , we denote by etree(M) its unfolding, i.e. the tree of all
possible executions of M (in Figure 1 the automata coincide with their unfolding
because there is no loop). If M is fully probabilistic, then each execution (maximal
branch) of etree(M) has a probability obtained as the product of the probability of
the edges along the branch. In the ﬁnite case, we can deﬁne a probability measure
for each set of executions, called event, by summing up the probabilities of the
elements 3 . Given an event x, we will denote by p(x) the probability of x. For
3 In the inﬁnite case things are more complicated: we cannot deﬁne a probability measure for all sets of
execution, and we need to consider as event space the σ-ﬁeld generated by the cones of etree(M). However,
in this paper, we consider only the ﬁnite case.
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instance, let the event c be the set of all computations in which c occurs. In (c) its
probability is p(c) = 1/3× 1/2 + 1/6 = 1/3.
When nondeterminism is present, the probability can vary, depending on how we
resolve the nondeterminism. In other words we need to consider a function ς that,
each time there is a choice between diﬀerent steps, selects one of them. By pruning
the non-selected steps, we obtain a fully probabilistic execution tree etree(M, ς) on
which we can deﬁne the probability as before. For historical reasons (i.e. since
nondeterminism typically arises from the parallel operator), the function ς is called
scheduler.
It should then be clear that the probability of an event is relative to the particular
scheduler. We will denote by pς(x) the probability of the event x under the scheduler
ς. For example, consider (a). We have two possible schedulers determined by the
choice of the step in s1. Under one scheduler, the probability of c is 1/2. Under the
other, it is 2/3 × 1/2 + 1/3 = 2/3. In (b) we have three possible schedulers under
which the probability of c is 0, 1/2 and 1, respectively.
2.2 The Dining Cryptographers
The general Dining Cryptographers Problem [6] is described as follows: A number
of cryptographers, situated in the nodes of a given connected graph, are having a
dinner. The representative of their organization (master) may or may not pay the
bill of the dinner. If he does not, then he will select exactly one cryptographer and
order him to pay the bill. The master will tell secretly each cryptographer whether
he has to pay or not. The cryptographers would like to reveal whether the bill is
paid by the master or by one of them, but, in the latter case, they wish to keep
anonymous the identity of the payer.
A possible solution to this problem, described in [6], is to associate a coin to
each edge of the graph, visible only to the adjacent cryptographers. The coins are
then tossed, and each cryptographer computes the binary sum of the adjacent coins
(counting 0, say, for head and 1 for tail), adds 1 if he is the payer, and outputs the
result.
In [6] it is proved that the payer is one of the cryptographers if and only if
the binary sum of all the outputs is 1. Furthermore, if the coins are fair, then an
external observer cannot identify the payer when it is one of the cryptographers.
The DCP will be a running example through the paper.
2.3 Anonymity systems
In this section we recall our approach to anonymity, as developed in [4].
We model the anonymity protocol as a probabilistic automaton M . The concept
of anonymity is relative to the set of anonymous users and to what is visible to the
observer. Hence, following [13,12] we classify the actions of M into the three sets
A,B and C as follows:
• A is the set of the anonymous actions A = {a(i) | i ∈ I} where I is the set of the
identities of the anonymous users and a is an injective functions from I to the set
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of actions, which we call abstract action. We also call the pair (I, a) anonymous
action generator.
• B is the set of the observable actions. We will use b, b′, . . . to denote the elements
of this set.
• C is the set of the remaining actions (which are unobservable).
Note that the actions in A normally are not visible to the observer, or at least, not
for the part that depends on the identity i. However, for the purpose of deﬁning and
verifying anonymity we model the elements of A as visible outcomes of the system.
Deﬁnition 2.1 An anonymity system is a tuple (M, I, a,B,Z , p), where M is a
probabilistic automaton, (I, a) is an anonymous action generator, B is a set of
observable actions, Z is the set of all possible schedulers for M , and for every
ς ∈ Z , pς is the probability measure on the event space generated by etree(M, ς).
If the system is fully probabilistic, then Z is a singleton and we omit it.
We introduce the following notation to represent the events of interest:
• a(i) : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing the action a(i);
• a : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing an action a(i) for an arbitrary i;
• o : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing as their maximal sequence of
observable actions the sequence o (where o is of the form b1b2 . . . bn for some
b1, b2, . . . , bn ∈ B). We denote by O (observables) the set of all such o’s.
We use the symbols ∪, ∩ and ¬ to represent the union, the intersection, and the
complement of events, respectively.
We wish to keep the notion of observables as general as possible, but we still need
to make some assumptions on them. First, we want the observables to be disjoint
events. Second, they must cover all possible outcomes. Third, an observable o must
indicate unambiguously whether a has taken place or not, i.e. it either implies a,
or it implies ¬a. In set-theoretic terms it means that either o is a subset of a or of
the complement of a. Formally:
Assumption 1 (on the observables)
(i) ∀ς ∈ Z . ∀o1, o2 ∈ O. o1 = o2 ⇒ pς(o1 ∪ o2) = pς(o1) + pς(o2)
(ii) ∀ς ∈ Z . pς(O) = 1
(iii) ∀ς ∈ Z . ∀o ∈ O. (pς(o ∩ a) = pς(o)) ∨ pς(o ∩ ¬a) = pς(o)
Analogously, we need to make some assumption on the anonymous actions. We
consider ﬁrst the conditions tailored for the nondeterministic users: each scheduler
determines completely whether an action of the form a(i) takes place or not, and
in the positive case, there is only one such i. Formally:
Assumption 2 (on the anonymous actions, for nondeterministic users)
∀ς ∈ Z . pς(a) = 0 ∨ (∃i ∈ I. (pς(a(i)) = 1 ∧ ∀j ∈ I. j = i ⇒ pς(a(j)) = 0))
In [4] the following strong notion of anonymity was proposed. Intuitively, given
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two schedulers ς and ϑ that both choose a (say a(i) and a(j), respectively), it should
not be possible to detect from the probabilistic measure of the observables whether
the scheduler was ς or ϑ (i.e. whether the selected user was i or j).
Deﬁnition 2.2 [(Strong) anonymity for nondeterministic users]
A system (M, I, a,B,Z , p) is anonymous if
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀o ∈ O. pς(a) = pϑ(a) = 1 ⇒ pς(o) = pϑ(o)
We now consider the case in which the users are fully probabilistic. The as-
sumption on the anonymous actions in this case is much weaker: we only require
that there be at most one user that performs a, i.e. a(i) and a(j) must be disjoint
for i = j. Formally:
Assumption 3 (on the anonymous actions, for probabilistic users)
∀i, j ∈ I. i = j ⇒ p(a(i) ∪ a(j)) = p(a(i)) + p(a(j))
The probabilistic counterpart of Deﬁnition 2.2 can be formalized using the
concept of conditional probability. Recall that, given two events x and y with
p(y) > 0, the conditional probability of x given y, denoted by p(x | y), is equal
to p(x ∩ y)/p(y).
Deﬁnition 2.3 A fully probabilistic system (M, I, a,B, p) is anonymous if
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (p(a(i)) > 0 ∧ p(a(j)) > 0) ⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j))
The notions of anonymity illustrated so far focus on the probability of the ob-
servables. In the case of probabilistic users, however, one can also approach the
concept of anonymity from the point of view of the probabilistic information asso-
ciated to the users. This is the perspective adopted in [7] to deﬁne what they call
conditional anonymity. The idea is that a system is anonymous if the observations
do not change the probability of the a(i)’s. In other words, we may know the prob-
ability of a(i) by some means external to the system, but the system should not
increase our knowledge about it. The same notion was proposed, implicitly, in [6].
This concept can be formulated in our framework as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.4 [(Strong) anonymity for probabilistic users] A fully probabilistic
system (M, I, a,B, p) is anonymous if
∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i) | a)
Despite Deﬁnitions 2.3 and 2.4 are based on conceptually diﬀerent interpreta-
tions of anonymity, it has been shown that they are equivalent (see [4]).
The deﬁnitions of anonymity illustrated in this section are satisﬁed by the DCP
only if the coins are fair. In next sections we propose weak versions of these def-
initions, which may be satisﬁed also when the coins are biased, depending on the
biased factor.
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Fig. 2. The DCP with three cryptographers and nondeterministic master.
3 Weak anonymity for nondeterministic users
In this section we propose a weak variant of Deﬁnition 2.2 and we study, in the
particular case of the DCP, how this property depends on the biased factor of the
coins.
Intuitively, the weakening consists in relaxing the constraint that the probability
of an observer implying a is the same under every scheduler. Instead, we require
that the diﬀerence between any two such probabilities does not exceed a certain
parameter α. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3.1 [α-anonymity for nondeterministic users] Given α ∈ [0, 1], a system
(M, I, a,B,Z, p) is α-anonymous if
max{ pς(o)− pϑ(o) | ς, ϑ ∈ Z, o ∈ O, pς(o ∩ a) = pς(o), pϑ(o ∩ a) = pϑ(o)} = α
Intuitively, pς(o) − pϑ(o) = α means that, whenever we observe o, we suspect
that user i is more likely than user j to have performed the action by an additive
factor α (where i and j represent the users selected by ς and ϑ, respectively).
Let us consider the DCP on a linear graph consisting of three nodes, i.e. three
cryptographers Crypt0, Crypt1, and Crypt2, and two edges, Coin0 between Crypt0
and Crypt1, and Coin1, between Crypt1 and Crypt2.
In case one of the cryptographers pays (event a), the possible observables are
o1 = 111 o2 = 100 o3 = 010 o4 = 001
where b0b1b2 refers to the outputs of Crypt0, Crypt1 and Crypt2, respectively. For
instance, if Crypt1 is the payer, then o1 is obtained when both the two coins give
1, o2 is obtained when Coin0 gives 1 and Coin1 gives 0, etc. In case the master
pays, then the possible observables are o5 = 110, o6 = 101, o7 = 011, o8 = 000. For
instance, o5 = 110 is obtained when Coin0 gives 1 and Coin1 gives 0.
The probabilistic automaton corresponding to this situation is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. For simplicity, we have drawn only the “big-step-transitions” corresponding
to the observables o1, o2 etc. They represents sequences of “small-step-transitions”
where each coin is ﬂipped, then each cryptographer in turn reads the coins, then it
computes and output the results.
It is important to note that we will consider only one form of nondeterminism:
that associated to the choice of the master (nondeterministic master, which in the
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Observables: o1 = 111, o2 = 100, o3 = 010, o4 = 001
Crypt0 pays Crypt1 pays Crypt2 pays
p(o1) β0(1− β1) (1− β0)(1− β1) (1− β0)β1
p(o2) β0β1 (1− β0)β1 (1− β0)(1− β1)
p(o3) (1− β0)β1 β0β1 β0(1− β1)
p(o4) (1− β0)(1− β1) β0(1− β1) β0β1
Table 1
Probabilities of the observables in the case of 3 cryptographers on a linear graph.
DCP is synonymous of nondeterministic users). In general in a system there is
also the nondeterminism caused by the diﬀerent possible interleaving of the various
components of the system, but here, for simplicity, we will assume that the order
in which the various components of the system (master, cryptographers, coins)
execute their operations is ﬁxed. In any case, it can be shown that this latter
form of nondeterminism would not aﬀect the properties of the DCP with respect to
anonymity.
Let us represent by βi the “biased factor” of Coin i, i.e. the probability that Coin i
gives 0. We want to determine how the parameter α of anonimity (Deﬁnition 3.1)
depends on β0 and β1.
Consider, for each scheduler that selects a payer among the cryptographers, the
possible observables and their probability measure. A simple calculation gives the
ﬁgures shown in Table 1. Then by case analysis, we obtain:
α =
⎧⎨
⎩
|1− (β0 + β1)| if (β0, β1 ≤ 0.5) or (β0, β1 ≥ 0.5);
|β0 − β1| if (β0 > 0.5 and β1 < 0.5) or (β0 < 0.5 and β1 > 0.5);
Figure 3 shows the graph of α as a function of β0 and β1.
The above analysis can be extended to the general case of linear graphs with
any number of nodes.
Theorem 3.2 In the DCP on a linear graph with n nodes the α in Deﬁnition 3.1
depends on the βi’s as follows:
α =
∏
βi≥0.5
βi
∏
βj<0.5
(1− βj) −
∏
βi≥0.5
(1− βi)
∏
βj<0.5
βj
Proof The highest possible probability for an observable corresponds to the coin
conﬁguration
Coin i =0 for βi ≥ 0.5 and Coinj = 1 for βj < 0.5 (1)
Conversely, the minimal probability corresponds to
Coin ′i =1 for βi ≥ 0.5 and Coin
′
j = 0 for βj < 0.5 (2)
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Fig. 3. The dependency of α-anonymity on β0 and β1 in the case of three cryptographers.
Clearly these conﬁgurations are obtained, respectively, with probabilities
p1 =
∏
βi≥0.5
βi
∏
βj<0.5
(1− βj) and p2 =
∏
βi≥0.5
(1− βi)
∏
βj<0.5
βj
we only need to show, now, that both these probabilities can be obtained (under
diﬀerent schedulers) for the same observable.
Consider the coin conﬁguration in (1). Let ς be the scheduler that selects Crypt0
as the payer. Then the system will output the observable o = b0b1 . . . bn−1 where
(using ⊕ to represent the binary sum)
b0 = Coin0 ⊕ 1
bi = Coini−1 ⊕ Coini for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2
bn−1 = Coinn−2
Clearly pς(o) = p1.
Consider now the coin conﬁguration in (2). Let ϑ be the scheduler that selects
Cryptn−1 as the payer. It is easy to see that the output o
′ = b′0b
′
1 . . . b
′
n−1 of the
system is the same as before, in fact for each i, Coin ′i = Coin i ⊕ 1. Hence we have:
b′0 = Coin
′
0 = Coin0 ⊕ 1 = b0
b′i = Coin
′
i−1 ⊕ Coin
′
i = Coini−1 ⊕ 1⊕ Coin i ⊕ 1
= Coin i−1 ⊕ Coini = bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2
b′n−1 = Coin
′
n−2 ⊕ 1 = Coinn−2 ⊕ 1⊕ 1 = Coinn−2 = bn−1
Hence we have o′ = o and pϑ(o) = p2. 
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It is possible to show that the above theorem holds also when the topology is
a ring. On the other hand, it does not hold for graphs which contain one or more
nodes with an odd number of adjacent edges.
Figure 4 illustrates the dependency of α on β for three to six cryptographers,
where for all i, βi = β (uniform coins). We note that the anonymity level increases
(i.e. α decreases) as the number of cryptographers increases. If the coins are fair
(β = 0.5), then we have strong anonymity, i.e. α = 0. In the two extreme cases of
β = 0 or β = 1, the α-anonymity is always 1, which is maximal. It is also possible
to show that α is expressed by a polynomial on β whose degree is n− 1 if n is even,
and n− 2 if n is odd.
4 Weak anonymity for probabilistic users
In this section we consider the case in which the user is selected according to a
certain probability distribution. Since we assume that we have no other source of
nondeterminism, the automata that we consider in this section are fully probabilis-
tic. For example, in the case of the DCP with three cryptographers, we have the
automaton represented in Figure 5.
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4.1 Focusing on the probabilities of the observables
The fully probabilistic version of Deﬁnition 3.1, corresponding also to the weak
version of Deﬁnition 2.3, is the following:
Deﬁnition 4.1 [α-anonymity for probabilisitic users] Given α ∈ [0, 1], a fully prob-
abilistic system (M, I, a,B, p) is α-anonymous if
max{ p(o | a(i))− p(o | a(j)) | i, j ∈ I, o ∈ O, p(a(i)) > 0, p(a(j)) > 0 } = α
Like Deﬁnition 3.1, this notion focuses on the probability of the observables.
It is possible to prove that for the DCP the α of the above deﬁnition depends
on the βi’s exactly like the α for nondeterministic users (Deﬁnition 3.1). In fact
consider, in the case of nondeterministic users, a scheduler ς that selects i, i.e.
pς(a(i)) = 1. Then assume, in the case of probabilistic users, that pς(a(i)) > 0. It
is easy to see that pς(o) = p(o | a(i)).
So, in a sense, the notion of anonymity proposed in Deﬁnition 4.1 does not seem
to introduce any new technical challenge with respect to the study done for the case
of nondeterministic users.
In next section we investigate, instead, the weak version of the alternative notion
of anonymity given in Deﬁnition 2.4.
4.2 Focusing on the probabilities of the users
We take here the point of view that anonymity means to preserve the probability
of the users, like in [6] and [7].
Deﬁnition 4.2 [α-anonymity for probabilisitic users – alternative notion] Given
α ∈ [0, 1], a fully probabilistic system (M, I, a,B, p) is α-anonymous if
max{ p(a(i) | o)− p(a(i) | a) | i ∈ I, o ∈ O, p(o ∩ a) > 0} = α
Intuitively, p(a(i) | o) − p(a(i) | a) = α means that, after observing o, the
probability we attribute to i as the performer of the action, has increased by an
additive factor α.
We study now the dependency of α on the βi’s in the case of the DCP with n
cryptographers on a linear graph. We need to introduce some deﬁnitions: Let pi be
the probability that Crypt i is the payer. Of course, the probability that one of the
cryptographers is the payer is then
∑n−1
i=0 pi. Let k be the index of the cryptographer
with the highest probability, i.e.
pk = max{pi | i ∈ [0, n − 1]}
For i ∈ [0, n − 2], deﬁne
γi =
⎧⎨
⎩
βi if βi ≥ 0.5
1− βi otherwise
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Finally, for an arbitrary j ∈ [0, n− 1], deﬁne
qj =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
j−1∏
i=0
γi
k−1∏
i=j
(1− γi)
n−2∏
i=k
γi if j ≤ k
k−1∏
i=0
γi
j−1∏
i=k
(1− γi)
n−2∏
i=j
γi otherwise
We are now ready to show how α depends on the βi’s:
Theorem 4.3 In the DCP on a linear graph with n nodes the α in Deﬁnition 4.2
depends on the βi’s (and on the pi’s) as follows:
α =
qk pk
n−1∑
j=0
qj pj
−
pk
n−1∑
j=0
pj
(3)
Proof By deﬁnition, the conﬁguration of the coins with the highest probability
is the one in which Coini = 0 if βi ≥ 0.5 and Coin i = 1 otherwise. The probability
of this conﬁguration is
∏
βi≥0.5
βi
∏
β<0.5
(1− β) =
n−2∏
i=0
γi = qk
Consider now the event a(k) expressing that Cryptk is the payer, and let o =
b0b1 . . . bn−1 be the observable which corresponds to the above coin conﬁguration
in combination with the event a(k). We will show that o and a(k) maximize the
expression p(a(i) | o′) − p(a(i) | a) and that it is equal to the Formula (3). First
we need to compute the conditional probability p(a(k) | o) = p(o ∩ a(k))/p(o). By
deﬁnition, p(o∩ a(k)) = qk pk. As for p(o), observe that p(o∩ a(j)) = qj pj for any
j ∈ [0, n−1], in fact to obtain the same o when Crypt j is the payer, it is suﬃcient to
ﬂip all the coins between j and k, which gives a coin conﬁguration with probability
qj. Hence, we have
p(o) =
n−1∑
j=0
p(o ∩ a(j)) =
n−1∑
j=0
qj pj
Finally it is easy to see that p(a(k) | o) maximizes p(a(i) | o′), that it is linear
on p(a(k), and that p(a(j) | a) = p(a(j))/p(a). Hence, p(a(k) | o) − p(a(k) | a)
maximizes p(a(i) | o′)− p(a(i) | a) and coincides with the Formula (3). 
Figure 6 shows the dependency of α on the βi’s in the case of three cryptogra-
phers. The various graphs refer to diﬀerent probability distributions for the payer.
It is worth noting that, in contrast to the notion of α-anonymity given in Deﬁni-
tion 4.1, the version presented in this section depends not only the βi’s, but also
on the p(a(i))’s. On the other hand, in the limit case of strong anonymity, the two
notions are equivalent, as explained in Section 2.3.
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Fig. 6. The dependency of α-anonymity on the βi’s in the case of three cryptographers.
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5 Automatic Analysis
In the case of a very simple topology (linear graphs) we have been able to express
the dependency of α on the βi’s with a mathematical formula. In this way, if we
have a system whose internal bias are known, it is immediate to check whether it
satisﬁes weak anonymity (for a given α) or not. It is possible to extend the method
also to rings, but as the graphs get more complicated, it is not clear how to proceed
to ﬁnd the formula that express the dependency. This is a typical situation for most
real-life systems: the symbolic analysis is often unfeasible, and we have to resort to
automatic tools supported by computers.
In this section, we describe how to use the probabilistic model checker PRISM
to check the property of the α-anonymity for the DCP. We consider both non-
deterministic and probabilistic masters (recall that in the DCP nondeterminis-
tic/probabilistic master is synonymous of nondeterministic/probabilistic users). We
model the DCP as a discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) in the case of a probabilis-
tic master, and as Markov decision process (MDP) in the case of a nondeterministic
master 4 . The PRISM input language is a simple, state-based language, based on
the Reactive Modules formalism of Alur and Henzinger [1]. The events are formal-
ized using the temporal probabilistic logic PCTL [8]. Once this translation is done,
we can use PRISM to compute the probabilities of the relevant events so to check
α-anonymity. A brief overview of PRISM and PCTL is given in the appendix.
The following code is for three cryptographers and two coins arranged in a
line. It can be easily generalized to more cryptographers and a diﬀerent graph
structure. First we describe the variables we use in the model. N is the number of
cryptographers, and, since the topology is a line, there are N-1 coins in the model.
The probabilities of each coin of showing head are deﬁned as beta0, beta1, etc. We
deﬁne three more state variables: s master: [0..2] for the master, s coin: [0..N-1]
to indicate how many coins have been ﬂipped, and s crypt: [0..N] to indicates how
many cryptographers have decided their outputs. payerid=N indicates that either
no cryptographer will pay or the master hasn’t decided yet.. Initially, they are all 0.
Once the execution terminates, we will have s master=2, s coin=N-1, and s crypt=N.
The variable payerid: [0..N] init N is used to record who is the payer. The variable
toss: bool init false is used to let the coins to be ﬂipped after the master has made
his decision.
In the following, we consider the case N = 3. We use the variables crypt0,
crypt1, crypt2 to record the values computed by each cryptographer, that are either
0 or 1 and depend on whether the cryptographer is paying and on the sides of the
coins the cryptographer can see. Initially, their values are 0. In the model, there
are two coins coin0 and coin1. The ﬁrst is shared shared by Cryptographers 0 and
1, the second is shared by Cryptographers 1 and 2. We use 0 for head, and 1 for
tail.
Next, we describe the behavior of the master, the coins and the cryptographers.
4 DTMC and MDP, which are the formats accepted by PRISM, can be seen as special cases of probabilistic
automata.
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If the master is nondeterministic, he will decide nondeterministically the payer: one
of the cryptographers (payerid = 0, 1, or 2) or himself (payerid = 3). Once he has
made the decision, the value of toss is set to true, in order to let the coins to be
ﬂipped.
[] (s master=0) → (s master’=1) & (payerid’=0);
[] (s master=0) → (s master’=1) & (payerid’=1);
[] (s master=0) → (s master’=1) & (payerid’=2);
[] (s master=0) → (s master’=1) & (payerid’=3);
[] (s master=1) & (!toss) → (s master’=2) & (toss’=true);
If the master is probabilistic, then the choice of the payer is based on a proba-
bility distribution. For instance:
[] (s master=0) →
0.5: (s master’=1) & (payerid’=0) +
0.3: (s master’=1) & (payerid’=1) +
0.1: (s master’=1) & (payerid’=2) +
0.1: (s master’=1) & (payerid’=3);
[] (s master=1) & (!toss) → (s master’=2) & (toss’=true);
Once toss becomes true, the coins start to ﬂip. With probabilities beta0 and
beta1, the side of the coins will be head. With probabilities 1-beta0 and 1-beta1,
the side of the coins will be tail. Each time when a coin is ﬂipped, the value of
s coin is increased by one.
[] (s coin=0) & (toss) →
beta0: (coin0’=0) & (s coin’=s coin+1) +
(1-beta0): (coin0’=1) & (s coin’=s coin+1);
[] (s coin=1) & (toss) →
beta1: (coin1’=0) & (s coin’=s coin+1) +
(1-beta1): (coin1’=1) & (s coin’=s coin+1);
After all the coins have been ﬂipped (s coin=N-1), the cryptographers calculate
the value of their variable crypt0, crypt1 and crypt2. Once a cryptographer has
terminated this calculation, the value of s crypt is increased by 1. Since the Cryp-
tographers 0 and 2 sit at the two ends of the line, they can only observe one coin:
Cryptographer 0 sees Coin 0, and Cryptographer 2 sees Coin 1. If Cryptographer
0 is the payer, he will set the variable crypt0 to 1 if he sees the head of Coin 0, and
to 0 otherwise. If Cryptographer 0 is not the payer, he will set crypt0 to 0 if he sees
the head of Coin 0, and to 1 otherwise. The code for Cryptographer 2 is similar:
just rename crypt0 into crypt2, coin0 into coin1, and s crypt=0 into s crypt=2.
[] (s crypt=0) & (s coin=N-1) & (payerid=0) & (coin0=0) s→
(crypt0’=1) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=0) & (s coin=N-1) & !(payerid=0) & (coin0=0) →
(crypt0’=0) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=0) & (s coin=N-1) & (payerid=0) & (coin0=1) →
(crypt0’=0) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
Y. Deng et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 180 (2007) 55–7670
[] (s crypt=0) & (s coin=N-1) & !(payerid=0) & (coin0=1) →
(crypt0’=1) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
The behavior of Cryptographer 1 is slightly diﬀerent, since he can observe two
coins. If he is the payer, he will set the variable crypt1 to 1 if the two coins have
the same side, and to 0 otherwise. If he is not the payer, he will set crypt1 to 0 if
the two coins have the same side, and to 1 otherwise.
[] (s crypt=1) & (s coin=N-1) & (payerid=1) & (coin1=coin0) →
(crypt1’=1) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=1) & (s coin=N-1) & !(payerid=1) & (coin1=coin0) →
(crypt1’=0) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=1) & (s coin=N-1) & (payerid=1) & !(coin1=coin0) →
(crypt1’=0) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=1) & (s coin=N-1) & !(payerid=1) & !(coin1=coin0) →
(crypt1’=1) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
A self-loop is added in the end of the speciﬁcation to avoid deadlock states 5 .
[] (s coin=N-1) & (s master=2) & (s crypt=N) →
(s coin’=N-1) & (s master’=2) & (s crypt’=N);
In the DCP, an external observer can see the values of the variables crypt0,
crypt2 and crypt2. Furthermore, the values of the variables in the PRISM model
deﬁne the states of the system. For example, the following predicate represents the
ﬁnal states in which all cryptographers output 1. We denote it by o1.
(crypt0=1) & (crypt1=1) & (crypt2=1) &
(s crypt=3) & (s coin=2) & (s master=2)
For each type of master (nondeterministic or probabilistic) we can describe ob-
servables as a PCTL formula by using the P operator (see Appendix A.2). Then,
we can use PRISM to compute the probability of each observable for the analysis
of α-anonymity.
Nondeterministic master:
If the master is nondeterministic, we can compute the maximum and the min-
imum probability of each observable, under any possible scheduler that selects one
of the cryptographers to pay. Below, we specify the PCTL formulas to compute the
probabilities of observable o1.
Pmax=?[true U o1] and Pmin=?[true U o1]
Thus, it is suﬃcient to use the formulation of α-anonymity given by the following
proposition, whose proof is immediate:
Proposition 5.1 A system (M, I, a,B,Z, p) is α-anonymous (with respect to non-
5 This is required by the design of PRISM.
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deterministic users) if
max{ max{ pς(o) | ς ∈ Z, pς(o ∩ a) = pς(o) }
−
min{ pϑ(o) | ϑ ∈ Z, pϑ(o ∩ a) = pϑ(o) } | o ∈ O } = α
The results in Figure 4 have been checked using PRISM.
Probabilistic master:
When the master is nondeterministic, α-anonymity is deﬁned as
max{ p(a(i) | o)− p(a(i) | a) |i ∈ I, o ∈ O, p(o ∩ a) > 0 } = α.
Since PRISM does not support the calculation of conditional probability as a
primitive, we have to compute each p(a(i) | o) using the equivalent expression
p(a(i) ∩ o)/p(o). As for p(a(i) | a), this is the same as p(a(i))/p(a). For example,
in case of three cryptographers, p(a(0) ∩ o1) can be computed by using the PCTL
formula
P=?[true U o1 ∧ (payerid = 0 )]
The results presented in Figure 6 have been checked using PRISM.
6 Conclusion and related work
We propose two notions of weak probabilistic anonymity, for the cases of nonde-
terministic and probabilistic users, respectively. We have applied these two notions
to the DCP with biased coins, and we have described the functional dependency of
the weakness level on the biased factor of the coins. Furthermore we have coded in
PRISM the DCP and the formulas that express weak anonymity.
This paper builds on the framework of probabilistic anonymity proposed in [4]
that we have summarized in Section 2.3. The notions that we investigate here
represent a generalization of the strong probabilistic anonymity proposed in [4].
To our knowledge, the ﬁrst notion of probabilistic anonymity was proposed (al-
though not with an explicit deﬁnition) in [6]. That notion corresponds to one of
the notions of strong anonymity for probabilistic users investigated in [4], and more
precisely, to the one recalled in Deﬁnition 2.4. This is the notion for which we have
given the weak version in Deﬁnition 4.2.
In [11] Reiter and Robin have proposed an hierarchy of notions of probabilistic
anonymity in the context of Crowds. We recall that Crowds is a system aimed
at protecting the identity of users when sending (originating) messages. This is
achieved by forwarding the message to another user selected randomly, which in
turn forward the message, and so on, until the message reaches its destination.
Part of the users may be corrupted (attackers), and one of the main purposes of
the protocol is to protect the identity of the originator of the message from those
attackers.
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The following is Reiter and Robin’s description of the hierarchy. Here the sender
stands for the user that forwards the message to the attacker.
Beyond suspicion From the attacker’s point of view, the sender appears no more
likely to be the originator of the message than any other potential sender in the
system.
Probable innocence From the attacker’s point of view, the sender appears no more
likely to be the originator of the message than to not be the originator.
Possible innocence From the attacker’s point of view, there is a nontrivial proba-
bility that the real sender is someone else.
These notions were only given informally in [11] and we are not sure how to interpret
them formally. However, the property of anonymity which is actually proved in
[11] for the system Crowds (and which the authors call “probable innocence”) is
described formally, and says that the probability that the originator forwards the
message to an attacker is not greater than 1/2. Equivalently, the probability that
an attacker receives the message from user i (observable event), given that i is the
originator of the message (event a(i)), is not greater than 1/2. A notion of probable
innocence in that sense is close to our Deﬁnitions 3.1 and 4.1 (for nondeterministic
and probabilistic users, respectively) with α ≤ 1/2. We are currently investigating
the precise relation between our notion of weak probabilistic anonymity and the
properties satisﬁed by Crowds.
Halpern and O’Neill have proposed in [7] various notions of probabilistic anonymity,
focusing on the probability of the users. Their principal notion is based on epis-
temic logic and is formulated as a requirement on the knowledge of the observer
about the probability of the user. They have given both strong and weak version
of this notion, proposing a formal interpretation the three levels of the hierarchy
proposed by [11] (see above). These notions do not seem directly related to the ones
we investigate in this paper. In particular, those in [11] depend on the probabili-
ties of the a(i)’s, while our notions abstract from these probabilities. On the other
hand, Halpern and O’Neill have proposed also another notion, called conditional
anonymity (cfr. Deﬁnition 4.4 in [7]), which corresponds to the strong probabilistic
anonymity recalled in Deﬁnition 2.4.
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A Appendix
A.1 A brief overview of PRISM
PRISM [10] is a probabilistic model checker. It allows one to model and analyze sys-
tems and algorithms containing probabilistic aspects. PRISM supports three kinds
of probabilistic models: discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), Markov decision
processes (MDPs) and continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs). In the following
we present the ﬁrst two models brieﬂy. A more detailed description of each model
and PRISM can be found at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/∼dxp/prism/.
A DTMC can be deﬁned as consisting of a ﬁnite set of states S, an initial state s0,
a transition probability matrix P : S×S → [0, 1] such that ∀s ∈ S,
∑
s′∈S P (s, s) =
1, and a labeling function from states to a ﬁnite set of atomic predicates L : S →
2AP . MDPs extend DTMCs by allowing both probabilistic and nondeterministic
behavior. An MDP is deﬁned as consisting of a set of states S, an initial state s0, a
function Steps which maps each state in S to a ﬁnite non-empty set of probability
distributions over S, and a labeling function L. The transition from a state s ∈ S
is determined by selecting an element μ of Steps(s) nondeterministically and then
choosing a state probabilistically, according to the distribution μ.
A system in PRISM is composed of a number of modules that contain local
variables, and that can interact with each other. The behavior of a DTMC is
described by a set of commands of the form:
[a] g → λ1 : u1 + . . . + λ : u;
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a is an action label in the style of process algebras, which introduces synchronization
into the model. It can only be performed simultaneously by all modules that have
an occurrence of action label a in their speciﬁcation. If a transition does not have to
synchronize with other transitions, then no action label needs to be provided for this
transition. The symbol g is a predicate over all the variables in the system. Each ui
describes a transition which the module can make if g is true. A transition updates
the value of the variables by giving their new primed value with respect to their
unprimed value. The λi are used to assign probabilistic information to the transition.
It is required that λ1+ · · ·+λ = 1. This probabilistic information can be omitted if
 = 1 (and so λ1 = 1). PRISM considers states without outgoing transitions as error
states; terminating states can be modeled by adding a self-loop. PRISM models
which are MDPs can also exhibit local non-determinism, which allows the modules
to make nondeterministic choices themselves. For example, the probabilistic choice
in the previous command can be made nondeterministic as follows:
[a] g → u1;
...
[a] g → u;
A.2 A brief overview of PCTL
PRISM performs model checking against speciﬁcations written in the probabilistic
temporal logic PCTL [8,5,3] if the model is a DTMC or an MDP, or CSL [2] in the
case of a CTMC. PCTL can express properties of the form “under any scheduling of
processes, the probability that event E occurs is at least p”. The syntax of PCTL
is given as follows:
Φ ::= true | false | a | Φ ∧ Φ | Φ ∨ Φ | ¬Φ | Pp[Ψ]
Ψ ::= XΦ | Φ U≤k Φ | Φ U Φ
where a are predicates over state variables, ∈ {<,≤,≥, >} is a Boolean operator,
p ∈ [0, 1] is a probability and k is an integer. Φ denotes a state formula and Ψ
a path formula, these are evaluated over states and paths of a DTMC or MDP,
respectively, where a path is a sequence of states connected by transitions. A state
always satisﬁes true, it never satisﬁes false . The Boolean operators have the usual
meanings. XΦ is true if and only if Φ is satisﬁed in the next state of the path.
Φ1 U
≤k Φ2 is true if and only if Φ2 is satisﬁed in one of the ﬁrst k states in the path
and Φ1 is satisﬁed in all preceding states. Φ1 U Φ2 is true if and only if Φ1 U
≤k Φ2
for some k ≥ 0. The formula P[Ψ] is true in a state s if the probability that a path
starting in s satisfying the path formula Ψ meets the bound  p. The deﬁnition of a
probability measure over paths of a DTMC is standard [8]. For MDPs, a probability
measure can only be deﬁned once the nondeterministic choices have been removed.
Hence, a more accurate interpretation of the formula Pp[Ψ] is that the probability
of Ψ being satisﬁed meets the bound  p for all resolutions of non-determinism [3].
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For the purpose of the analysis of α-anonymity, we are interested in formulas
of the form Pp[true U Φ], evaluated in the initial state s0. Here, Φ speciﬁed a
system conﬁguration of interest, typically representing a particular observation by
the external observers.
In general, PCTL formulas must always evaluate to a Boolean value, the proba-
bilistic operators P should always include a bound  p. However, it is often useful
to know the actual probability that some behavior is observed, rather than just
check that the probability is above or below a given bound. PRISM allows proper-
ties of the form P=?[Ψ]. These formulas return a numerical rather than a Boolean
value. Again note that, for MDPs, since probabilities can only be computed once
the nondeterministic choices have been resolved. Hence, there is actually a min-
imum and a maximum probability of a path formula being satisﬁed, quantifying
over all possible resolutions. Therefore, for MDPs PRISM allows two possible types
of formula: Pmax=?[Ψ] and Pmin=?[Ψ], which return the maximum and minimum
probabilities, respectively.
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